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PRODIGAL REASONING: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
THE NEED FOR A RETURN TO ANALYSIS
Benjamin White*

I. INTRODUCTION
The federal Constitution groans under the exegesis and eisegesis of its
countless expositors, but a second constitution, often overlooked, also
orders the lives of most Americans. State citizens enjoy the additional
protection of their state constitution, which applies with a force equal to
the federal Constitution.1 When the Nation’s founders “split the atom of
autonomy,” they situated American citizens within two political
realities: “one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by
the other.”2 Not only may state constitutions confer rights with no
federal corollary (for instance, the right to a remedy for injuries done to
a person’s land, goods, person, or reputation3) but state supreme courts
may also construe similar constitutional protections—such as the free
exercise of religion versus an unhindered right of the conscience4—as
having a substantive difference.
The United States Supreme Court consistently acknowledges states’
abilities to adopt more expansive liberties in their constitutions than
exist in the federal Constitution.5 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
recognized the legitimacy of what is sometimes called Judicial
Federalism, or New Federalism—the proposition that the rulings of the
United States Supreme Court “are not, and should not be, dispositive of
questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
law.”6 Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton has coined the expression “imperfect
solutions” to positively refer to states’ constitutional alternatives to
precedent based on the federal Constitution.7 He argues that state
constitutional law would benefit from greater independence from United
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to Professor
Marianna Bettman and Judge Jeffrey Sutton for reviewing this article. Very special thanks to Professor
Michael Solimine for his perceptive feedback and continuing conversation.
1. Sanford Levinson, America’s “Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State Constitutions
for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 813, 813 (2009).
2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).
3. OHIO CONST. art I, § 16
4. Id. art. I, § 7; Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000).
5. E.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
6. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 502 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan].
7. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 165, 175 (2009) [hereinafter Sutton, State Constitutional Law]; JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51
IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS 19 (2018) [hereinafter SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS].
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States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Confronted with difficult and
divisive constitutional issues, “it may be more appropriate to have fiftyone imperfect solutions rather than one imperfect solution.”8
These jurists recognize that the federal Constitution is not the
fountainhead of all constitutional guarantees.9 The contrary is often true.
In crafting the federal Bill of Rights, the drafters drew from state
constitutions.10 Each of the protections enumerated in the federal Bill of
Rights had a prior correspondent in one or more state constitutions.11
Despite the reality that a state constitution is “a document of
independent force,”12 the Supreme Court of Ohio has a strained
association with Judicial Federalism. Ohio’s high court first embraced
Judicial Federalism in 1993 with Arnold v. City of Cleveland,13 a
decision interpreting Ohio’s constitutional gun rights provision based on
its historical basis and textual difference from the federal Second
Amendment. The Ohio Supreme Court has also departed from the
United States Supreme Court on free exercise,14 eminent domain,15 and
certain warrantless arrests,16 to name a few. But these are some rare
exceptions.17 The Court often locksteps with the United States Supreme
Court.18 As a matter of policy, there is nothing wrong with this. But
alarmingly, principled reasoning has, like a prodigal, departed some of
the Court’s opinions that break from the lockstep—resulting in decisions
that purport to enlarge rights under the Ohio Constitution but waste an
opportunity to give good reasons why.19 Consequently, these decisions
reflect unpredictability in Ohio constitutional law, rather than a
commitment to basic principles of constitutional interpretation.
Section II lays out the background of Judicial Federalism, including
8. Sutton, State Constitutional Law, supra note 7, at 175.
9. Brennan, supra note 6, at 501.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus.
13. Id.; see also State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 15.
14. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000).
15. Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115.
16. State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, paragraph one of the
syllabus.
17. For other instances when the court has held that the Ohio constitution affords greater
protection than its federal counterpart, see Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger’s concurrence in Simpkins v.
Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 61.
18. E.g., Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d
55, 60, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999) (We affirm, therefore, that the federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses
are to be construed and analyzed identically.”)
19. E.g., State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 78 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing a lead opinion which lacked the “careful analysis set forth in the Arnold opinion
to justify [their] conclusion[s] that the Ohio Constitution affords greater protection”); see also State v.
Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862.
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exemplary state supreme court decisions that model sound legal
analysis. Section III examines Ohio’s tradition of Judicial Federalism
and recent illustrative cases. Section IV argues that the Ohio Supreme
Court should return to and reinforce its tradition of resorting to simple
standards when determining whether the Ohio Constitution offers
Ohioans greater protection than the federal Constitution.
II. THE RISE OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
A. Relationship Between State Supreme Courts and the United States
Supreme Court
As early as 1874, the United States Supreme Court in Murdock v. City
of Memphis acknowledged the fitness of state courts to adjudicate
individuals’ federal rights.20 Facing the contention that certain rights
cannot be wholly protected without Supreme Court review, Justice
Miller wrote that eighty-five years of living “under the opposite theory”
contradicted that argument.21 The Court understood as axiomatic that
state courts do not disregard or resist the influence of clear federal law.22
Even more obvious was the Court’s authority to resolve dispositive
federal questions.23 Therefore, matters “not of a Federal character”—
that is, matters arising under a state constitution, statute, or common
law—could not be said to necessitate Supreme Court review.24
Often, however, state courts are deciding issues that involve both
state and federal constitutions.25 As it remains “emphatically the
province and duty” of the federal judiciary to expound the federal
Constitution,26 when the record does not clearly reveal that a state court
based its decision on its state constitution rather than the federal
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court may “take steps to
protect [its] jurisdiction when [it is] given reasonable grounds to believe
it exists.”27 In Herb v. Pitcairn, Justice Jackson observed that the
Court’s review only applies to the incorrect adjudication of federal
20. 87 U.S. 590 (1874).
21. Id. at 632.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 632-33.
25. RANDY J. HOLLAND, STEPHEN R. MCALLISTER, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JEFFREY S. SUTTON,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE 166 (1st ed. 2010).
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
27. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945). See also Murdock, 87 U.S. at 632 (“when the
Supreme Court is of opinion that the question of Federal law is of such relative importance to the whole
case that it should control the final judgment, that court is authorized to render such judgment and
enforce it by its own process.”).
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rights.28 Revision of an incorrect, but non-dispositive, federal issue
would amount to an impermissible advisory opinion.29 Thus, to signal to
the United States Supreme Court that their review is unnecessary, state
courts need to show that their decisions are grounded in an “adequate”
and “independent” state basis.30
Justice Jackson’s concerns in Herb found fuller expression in
Michigan v. Long.31 Writing for the Long majority, Justice O’Connor
cited respect for state court independence and the need to avoid advisory
opinions as the mainsprings for the Court’s abstention from review
when faced with “an adequate and independent state ground.”32 When
the face of a state court decision rests on or is interwoven with federal
law, bearing no marks of reliance on any state grounds, the Supreme
Court will presume that the decision reflects the state court’s best effort
at resolving the federal issue.33 Such an opinion is not immune from
Supreme Court review. The now-familiar rule holds that “[i]f the state
court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively
based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state grounds,
we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.”34
Long has been criticized for reversing a tradition of presuming the
non-reviewability of state court cases, establishing instead a
presumption of Supreme Court jurisdiction.35 On its own terms,
however, Long sought to resolve the problem of ad hoc review of state
court decisions and state law.36 Existing principles had not availed the
Court in resolving the “vexing issue” of ascertaining whether a state
court’s non-federal basis provided independent and adequate support for
its judgment.37 First, the Supreme Court’s own review of state law
forced the justices to interpret laws with which they were unfamiliar and

28. Herb, 324 U.S. at 125-26.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 125.
31. 463 U.S. 1032.
32. Id. at 1040.
33. Id. at 1040-41. A state court may rely on federal precedents for guidance, but should plainly
state that its use of the federal cases was only for guidance, and that they did not compel the court’s
decision.
34. Id. at 1041.
35. See Carol Anne Kann, Supreme Court Review of State Court Cases: Principled Federalism
or Selective Bias? 36 EMORY L.J. 1277, 1279 (1987) [hereinafter Kann].
36. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039.
37. Id. at 1038 (quoting Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931)). Among the
Court’s guiding principles: dismissing the case outright when the decisional grounds were unclear;
vacating or continuing to clarify the nature of the state court’s judgment; and undertaking a review of
state law to determine if the state court had used federal law to guide its application of state law. None
of these approaches consistently preserved the relationships between federal and state governments. Id.
at 1038-39.
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which the parties rarely briefed in great detail.38 Second, vacating the
lower decision and continuing the case for clarification was inefficient
and time-consuming. This approach also burdened the state courts to
demonstrate whether or not the Supreme Court had jurisdiction.39 Third,
the need for uniformity in federal law rendered outright dismissal
counterproductive, because in doing so the Court foreclosed review of
decisions founded on primarily federal grounds, thus forfeiting
opportunities to refine the federal law on particular issues.40 When “the
four corners of the opinion” do not reveal a state court’s reliance on a
state ground, the state court has potentially compromised a federal issue,
undermining federal uniformity.41
But uniformity is a contested virtue in a federalist government. As a
matter of federalism, “we expect and comfortably tolerate” non-uniform
substantive law from state to state.42 Each state has authority
independent from the others and from the central government;
legislative diversity is inevitable.43 Quite the contrary from being a thorn
in the nation’s side, this diversity is “one of the happy incidents” of
federalism.44 States can and do serve as laboratories, experimenting with
new policies that pose no risk to the rest of the country.45 Professor
Lawrence Sager, for one, would not prevent “those state courts which
are prepared to enlarge upon the enforcement of underenforced
constitutional norms from doing so.”46 The Supreme Court, however,
has jealously guarded its role as the final arbiter of the meaning of the
U.S. Constitution.47 The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court
the authority to review losing claims in state courts when state action
was alleged to violate the federal Constitution.48 The Court could not
review prevailing federal claims of unconstitutionality until 1914.49 The
Court now exercises that authority through 28 U.S.C. § 1257.50
California v. Green showed that the Supreme Court is not reluctant to
rein in a state supreme court’s expansion of a Bill of Rights Provision.51
38. Id. at 1039.
39. Id. at 1039-40.
40. Id. at 1040.
41. Id.
42. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1251 (1978) [hereinafter Sager].
43. Id.
44. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
45. Id.
46. Sager, supra note 42, at 1253.
47. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
48. Sager, supra note 42, at 1242-43.
49. Id.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
51. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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The California Supreme Court held that a belated cross-examination on
a witness’s out of court statements violates the Confrontation Clause.52
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court. By
its lights, the Confrontation Clause was not offended as long as the
declarant could later be required to explain inconsistences between his
former and current testimonies.53 When full cross-examination remains
possible, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.54 Thus, the Supreme
Court flexed its arms on this federal issue and took advantage of its right
to give construction to the federal constitutional provision. Green was
the first time the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court’s
expansion on a Bill of Rights protection.55
Green represents an issue related to Professor Sager’s criticism of
Supreme Court review (and reversal) of state court expansions on
federal guarantees. Professor Sager has argued that it is inappropriate for
the Supreme Court to review state court decisions that enforce
constitutional rights no further than the margin of that federal
constitutional guarantee.56 The Supreme Court has not shared Professor
Sager’s favorable perspective on parity. When Ohio v. Robinette was
first brought before the Ohio Supreme Court (Robinette I),57 Justice
Pfeifer, writing for a 4-3 majority, attempted to establish a bright-line
rule about consensual interrogations with police officers. The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I
of the Ohio Constitution share similar wording.58 Robinette I held that
any police attempt attempting to initiate a consensual interrogation must
first advise the civilian, “At this time you legally are free to go,” or
words to that effect.59 Unfortunately for the defendant, the Ohio
Supreme Court based its ruling expressly under the federal and state

52. Id. at 153.
53. Id. at 164.
54. Id.
55. Kann, supra note 35, at 1278.
56. Sager, supra note 42, at 1248 (“If an underenforced constitutional norm is valid to its
conceptual boundaries, the decision of the state court can be understood as the enforcement of the
unenforced margin of a constitutional norm, that is, as the assumption of an important constitutional role
which the federal courts perceive themselves constrained to avoid because of institutional concerns.”).
57. 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995) (“Robinette I”).
58. Compare OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person and things to be seized.”) with U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.”).
59. Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 655.
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constitutions, bringing the decision squarely in Long’s crosshairs.60
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court,
noting that the proper federal test depends on reasonableness, not a
bright-line rule.61 Justice Ginsburg concurred, suspecting that the Ohio
Supreme Court did not actually believe its bright-line rule would apply
to the entire country.62 She recognized Ohio’s courts occupied a “unique
vantage point,” having observed that traffic stops throughout Ohio had
routinely led to contraband searches where the officers had no
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.63 Subtle though it may be,
Justice Ginsburg’s observation highlights an important capacity of
Judicial Federalism: the value of state judges’ familiarity with local and
regional dynamics when construing constitutional rights as they apply to
the state’s own citizens.
B. State Supreme Court Vanguards
1. State Court Responses to Federal Doctrines
There are various approaches to state court adoption of federal
constitutional doctrine.64 State courts may “unreflectively” adopt the
constitutional boundaries drawn by the United States Supreme Court,
applying those boundaries to state constitutional rights.65 Alternatively,
state courts may adopt federal analysis in interpreting their own
constitutions on a case-by-case basis.66 “Prospective lockstepping”
occurs when the state court applies federal analysis not only for the case
at bar, but for all future matters involving the same constitutional
guarantee.67 State courts may also prospectively adopt a United States
Supreme Court’s test or standard used in a given constitutional
doctrine.68 It is worth noting that most state courts, on most issues, walk
in lockstep with federal courts.69

60. Id.
61. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (“Robinette II”).
62. Id. at 42.
63. Id. at 40.
64. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 193-209 (2009)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS].
65. Id. at 196-97.
66. Id. at 197-200.
67. Id. at 200-05.
68. Id. at 205-07. This approach is not as strict as prospective lockstepping, because the court
adopts a federal method as opposed to a bright line rule. “The state court’s actual decision or outcome in
a specific case, in other words, might not in all cases conform to federal precedents.” Id. at 205.
69. Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002).
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From a posture of unreflective adoption, state courts apply “federal
analysis to a state clause without acknowledging the possibility of a
different outcome.”70 This approach may be at the expense of more
protective guarantees under the state constitution.71 Justice Hans Linde
of the Oregon Supreme Court has criticized the dearth of analysis that
accompanies some state court adoption of federal constitutional
interpretations.72 In State v. Kennedy, after the United States Supreme
Court had already reversed the Oregon Court of Appeals, Justice Linde
addressed the argument that when a state constitution’s provisions are
“substantially identical” to the federal or other state constitutions, then
the presumption follows that the state constitutional framers shared the
same objectives as the framers of those constitutions.73 He permitted that
this may be so, but recognized that discovering constitutional objectives
is different from discovering the correct application of constitutional
meaning.74 The framers of the Oregon Constitution may have shared the
same goal in forbidding Double Jeopardy as the framers of the United
States Constitution; but there is no straight line leading to the conclusion
that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of the federal
Double Jeopardy clause “presumptively fix its correct meaning also in
state constitutions.”75
Professor Laurence Tribe has expressed similar concerns in the
federal context. When Arkansas public schools refused to desegregate
after Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court in Cooper v.
Aaron reiterated Marbury v. Madison’s basic lesson that federal
explication of the United States Constitution, and therefore the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown, was the
“supreme law of the land.”76 Tribe identifies two possible assumptions
inscribed in that pronouncement. First, a Supreme Court constitutional
decision effectively “announces a general norm of wide applicability.”77
This reading aggrandizes Supreme Court power over parties not
appearing before it, but is justified by the great importance of equality.78
The second, more odious interpretation of Cooper’s pronouncement is
that “the Constitution is what the Court says it is, and no more.”79 If
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
TRIBE].
78.
79.

WILLIAMS at 197.
See id.
State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983).
Id. at 1322.
Id.
Id.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33-34 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
Id. at 34.
Id.
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true, then constitutional meaning does not invite “legitimate dispute”
when the Court has rendered a decision.80 But this view “ignores the
reality that . . . the Court is not alone is its responsibility to address that
meaning.”81 Among the parties responsible for construing constitutional
meaning, Tribe states, are state courts.82 These criticisms highlight the
importance of independent analysis from state courts.
2. Constitutional Guarantees Unique to the State
Justice Linde’s analysis in Sterling v. Cupp is significant for its
textual and historical depth, but also for his guidance on the proper
sequence of state court adjudication of multiple claims when they
include both state and federal issues.83 In Sterling, male prisoners
brought claims arising under both the Oregon and the United States
Constitutions, complaining of offensive touching and observation by
female security guards.84 Justice Linde announced that state law analysis
should precede federal analysis.85 This makes sense: assuming state law
applies at all, it does not deny any right flowing from the federal
Constitution.86 A valid state constitutional guarantee will go no lower
than the floor of the federal Constitution. Justice Linde cited his opinion
in State v. Scharf as support.87 In Scharf, the defendant had been denied
the right to counsel after being arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol.88 Justice Linde indicated the state constitutional provisions
may extend further than their federal analogues.89 The state guarantee
can provide the protection sought and still harmonize with Fourteenth
Amendment due process.90 And yet, although the United States
Constitution only limits state officials, the mere absence of contrary
state law does not necessarily authorize state action.91 State law must
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 75. Tribe’s discussion deals facially with federal constitutional meaning, but his
concerns with Supreme Court preemption of alternative yet legitimate views relates directly to the
matter at hand.
83. 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
84. Id. at 125.
85. Id. at 126.
86. Id. “The proper sequence is to analyze the state’s law, including its constitutional law, before
reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of
style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the
claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.”
87. Id., fn. 2; State v. Scharf, 605 P.2d 690 (1980) (overruled on other grounds).
88. Scharf, 605 P.2d at 691.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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affirmatively grant state officials the power to execute certain
procedures.92
Application of the “state-issue first” principle in Sterling did not
prevent Linde from critiquing the vague contours of the right to privacy
first conjured in Griswold v. Connecticut.93 The prisoners had claimed
that the prison’s policy of permitting female security guards to frisk
male prisoners and observe them while using the toilet or shower
violated their (federal) right to privacy and numerous guarantees
provided by the Oregon Constitution.94 Justice Linde characterized the
right to privacy as “protean and emotive,” quoting Professor Tribe in
stating, “[a] concept in danger of embracing everything is a concept in
danger of conveying nothing.”95 Federal litigants had seized upon the
expansive reach of the federal right, such that Linde suspected that the
prisoners had raised it in state court out of habit.96 As asserted by
prisoners, however, the right to privacy faced the disadvantage of a
federal Constitution with relatively modest penal restrictions, limited to
bills of attainder and cruel and unusual punishment.97
By contrast, state constitutions “often contain clauses expressly
directed toward guaranteeing humane treatment of those prosecuted for
crime.”98 Here is an important point on advocacy. As Judge Sutton has
written, sometimes “the only way a lawyer can win is through the state
constitution because it is the only constitution with a provision on
point.”99 The Oregon Constitution, for its part, guaranteed protections
which had no federal corollary. For instance, it provided that the
purpose of punishment shall be for reformation, not retribution, and
shall not affect persons or estates beyond that of the convicted
individual.100 Most important for the prisoners’ claim was the provision
that “[n]o person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with
unnecessary rigor.”101
Justice Linde traced the history of the Oregon Constitution’s
provisions back to New Hampshire’s 1783 constitution.102 Ohio and
Indiana borrowed similar provisions, and the “unnecessary rigor”

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Sterling, 625 P.2d at 126 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 127 (quoting TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 888-889 (1976)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at 19.
Sterling, 625 P.2d at 127.
OR. CONST. art. I, § 13.
Sterling, 625 P.2d at 128.
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guarantee appeared in Tennessee’s constitution in 1796.103
Acknowledging that texts differ, Justice Linde observed that some state
constitutional conventions considered humane penal principles
important enough to constitutionalize, even if James Madison did not
engrave them into the Bill or Rights or if Congress has not amended the
federal Constitution.104 In this tradition, the Oregon Constitution
mandated protections for which the United States Constitution—or cases
interpreting it, for that matter—had no analogue.105
Oregon’s constitutional guarantee against treating inmates with
unnecessary rigor proved to be “a more cogent premise” than the federal
right to privacy.106 First, the source of the right was unquestionable.
Whereas a “right to privacy” is an interpretative but not textual federal
right, the right against “unnecessary rigor” was “expressly included in
the political act of adopting a constitution.”107 Justice Linde thus
attached importance not only to the explicitness of the constitutional
right, but also the revealed political will of Oregonians. Second,
protection against “unnecessary rigor” was textually germane to the
claim at issue. The same could not be said of the “right to privacy,”
especially faced with the circumstance that rights of privacy are subject
to forfeit after a criminal conviction.108 The federal claim, in other
words, offered protection less consistent and less focused than the state
claim, which was drafted to apply to the very circumstances alleged by
the prisoners.109 Third, privacy is an elastic concept, waxing or waning
in potency depending on the public policies at play.110 In a prison
context, the public policies often cut in the prison’s favor. By contrast,
the state claim scrutinizes state action by a necessity test and expressly
applies to prisons.111
Justice Linde’s demonstration of the state claim’s superiority showed
more than just the advantage of analyzing state claims before federal
claims; he also showed state constitutional claims often include greater
protection than federal constitutional claims.

103. Id., fn. 11.
104. Id. at 129.
105. Id. at 128 (“The Oregon Constitution long has included in its Bill of Rights, besides the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, no less than five such provisions that have no federal
parallel.”).
106. Id. at 129.
107. Id.
108. Sterling, 625 P.2d at 129.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 8

1110

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

3. Parallel Guarantees, Different Results
Sterling displayed how a state supreme court may proceed when a
litigant presents both state and federal claims. Another issue is how a
state supreme court chooses to interpret state constitutional provisions
when they parallel a federal right. In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, the
question before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s similarly-worded guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Pennsylvania’s highest court decided that the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was not part of the
Commonwealth’s jurisprudence under Article 1, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.112 In so holding, the court flatly rejected the
federal doctrine handed down by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Leon, which held that the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States does not require the “extreme
sanction” of excluding evidence when the officer acted in good faith
reliance on an unconstitutional warrant.113 Edmunds is significant not
just for rendering a rule contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, but simultaneously establishing “a methodology to be
followed in analyzing future state constitutional issues which arise under
own Constitution.”114 Justice Ralph Cappy modeled a principled
hermeneutic in reaching that result.
First, Justice Cappy discussed the federal case itself. Historical
analysis revealed that Leon departed from a tradition of excluding
unconstitutionally-seized evidence.115 The exclusionary rule was a
judicial remedy to violations of the Fourth Amendment and had its basis
in deterring unconstitutional police activity.116 Leon reasoned that
excluding evidence acquired pursuant to an officer’s good faith reliance
on an improper warrant deprives the prosecution from the use of that
evidence without correcting undesirable police behavior.117
Weary of the withering eye of Michigan v. Long, Justice Cappy
emphasized the importance of rooting present and future decisions on
Pennsylvania law to avoid review or reversal by the United States
Supreme Court.118 Therefore, litigants were directed to brief—and
courts directed to apply—at least these four factors: (1) the text of the

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (1991).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
Id. at 894.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 892.
Id.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 895.
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Pennsylvania constitutional provision; (2) that provision’s history,
including Pennsylvania court decisions; (3) related case-law from other
states; and (4) policy considerations, including “unique issues of state
and local concern, and applicability with modern Pennsylvania
jurisprudence.”119
Applying that four-part framework, Edmunds began with a review of
the Pennsylvania constitution’s text, which was similar to the Fourth
Amendment’s language.120 Critically, textual proximity was not enough
to bind the state’s highest court to the meaning preferred by the United
States Supreme Court—even if the text is identical.121
The historical inquiry, however, proved to be the crucial analysis.
Pennsylvanians enjoyed state constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures more than ten years before the
federal Constitution was adopted, and more than fifteen years before the
Fourth Amendment was ratified.122 The framers of the federal
Constitution looked to the Pennsylvania Constitution and other state
constitutions in sourcing much of what became the federal Bill of
Rights.123 Delaware provided a precursor to the federal guarantee
against ex-post facto laws; North Carolina created rights for the accused,
like trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination.124 Article
1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution—guaranteeing citizens the
“right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and possessions free from
search and seizure” that occurs without a warrant—also preceded the
federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.125 The primary historical
purpose of a warrant was to protect against the noxious British practice
of sweeping residences and businesses based on nothing more than
general suspicion.126 A “strong notion of privacy” thus embodied Article
1, Section 8.127 This privacy interest indwelt the state’s exclusionary
rule.128 Justice Cappy contrasted the purposes of the Pennsylvania
exclusionary rule with those of the federal exclusionary rule,
acknowledging Leon’s position that the sole purpose of Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct.129 To
the extent the federal exclusionary rule was ever purposed to safeguard
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 895-96
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 897.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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privacy, by 1973 the United States Supreme Court was vocalizing the
central importance of deterring unlawful police conduct rather than
redressing the injury to privacy.130
Meanwhile, Pennsylvania jurisprudence had remained true to the
original motivation undergirding the exclusionary rule: protecting
privacy. The United States Supreme Court based the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule on the inability for evidence
suppression to correct police misbehavior. Where there is no police
misconduct, there is no need for deterrence. But since Pennsylvania’s
exclusionary rule never rested completely on deterrence, its purpose
applied even when officers acted in good faith on unconstitutional
warrants. An officer’s good faith did not ameliorate the injury to
privacy. By elevating privacy above deterrence, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court preserved the Pennsylvania Constitution’s exclusionary
rule, as its purposes were still served by the suppression of evidence. By
history’s light, therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
adoption of a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule “would
virtually emasculate those clear safeguards which have been carefully
developed under the Pennsylvania Constitution over the past 200
years.”131
Edmunds shows that even when a state’s constitutional text is
practically identical to the federal text, a state’s history is gravid with
meaningful differences from the parallel federal guarantee. The use of
history can lead to drastically different results.
4. The Necessity of Principled State Constitutional Analysis
An important criticism of Ohio Supreme Court’s cases expanding
protection under the Ohio Constitution, beyond that which exists under
the federal document, is the neglect of analysis.132 It is not controversial
that Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force which may
extend broader coverage over individual rights than the federal
Constitution mandates.133 But absent an independent analysis of the state
constitution’s text, history, or early understandings, it remains unclear
“why Ohio constitutional law should differ from the federal law.”134
That trifecta of considerations, and others, have been a boon to other
130. Id.
131. Id. at 899. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also performed analysis on related case-law
from other states and policy considerations.
132. See, e.g., State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St. 3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 110
(French, J., dissenting); State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862 (Aalim I), ¶
33-34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133. Aalim I, 2016-Ohio-8278, ¶ 46.
134. Mole, 74 N.E.3d at 399, quoting State v. Brown, 39 N.E.3d 496, 503 (Ohio 2015).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/8

14

White: Prodigal Reasoning: State Constitutional Law and the Need for a R

2018]

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN OHIO

1113

state supreme courts interpreting their constitutions. In State v. Gunwall,
the Washington Supreme Court set forth nonexclusive criteria relevant
for determining when its state constitution should be interpreted to
afford more significant rights than the federal Constitution.135 Sharing
some factors in common with the Edmunds considerations, these
included inquiries into the language, textual differences, constitutional
history, preexisting state law, structural differences, and matters of state
and local concern.136 Articulation of these interpretive principles was
necessary in light of the growing concern with the expansion of state
constitutional rights without an adequate analytical basis.137 Review of
state decisions revealed that the resort to state constitutional law, instead
of analogous federal provisions, was often supported by little more than
the simple announcement that the decision had a state constitutional
basis, with no further explanation.138
The problem with these unsupported expansions of constitutional
rights is that “they establish no principled basis for repudiating federal
precedent and thus furnish little or no rational basis for counsel to
predict the future course of state decisional law.”139 Constitutional
principles do not “spring forth from the brow of an Olympian jurist”
pondering mysteries, but from an “articulable, reasonable and reasoned”
process.140 By announcing from the bench specific analytical
touchstones, the Washington Supreme Court had both practical and
jurisprudential goals. First, they intended to guide counsel in briefing
their state constitutional claims.141 Second, they aimed to ensure that, if
they did rely on state constitutional grounds, their decision would rest on
“well founded legal reasons and not by merely substituting our notion of
justice for that of duly elected legislative bodies or the United States
Supreme Court.”142 Thus, a rational, replicable state constitutional
hermeneutic promotes both the separation of powers and federalism.
Justice Goodwin Liu of the California Supreme Court has pointed out
the infirmities of the “criteria approach.”143 “Most significantly,” he
says, “the approach treats federal precedent with a presumption of

135. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 811.
138. Id. at 811-12.
139. Id. at 812.
140. Id. (quoting Professor George R. Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I,
Section 7, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331, 347–48 (1985)).
141. Id. at 813.
142. Id.
143. Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1314 (2017).
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correctness that has no sound basis in our federal system.”144 Especially
when it comes to state constitutional issues in equal protection, due
process, or search and seizure, courts may focus on federal law or adopt
federal tests because the authority is abundant and developed.145 But
Justice Liu advises that, rather than trusting in interpretative
methodologies, “the crucial point is that state courts, as the ultimate
arbiters of state law, have the prerogative and duty to interpret their state
constitutions independently.”146
Nevertheless, showing discipline in the analytical process has the
virtue of predictability and replicability, enabling advocates to provide
better guidance to their clients. A state court that does not address state
constitutional claims with principled reasoning frustrates the already
difficult task of advocacy. Next, we will address the refreshingly simple
solution Ohio has employed in interpreting its constitution.
III. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN OHIO
A. The Ohio Tradition
1. Arnold v. Cleveland
The Ohio tradition of Judicial Federalism begins with Arnold v.
Cleveland.147 The Ohio Supreme Court recently recognized that “Arnold
stands as the court’s first clear embrace of Justice William J. Brennan’s
watershed article.”148 Arnold addressed a local ordinance passed in
Cleveland, banning the possession and sale of “assault weapons.”149
Some exceptions applied, such as for police officers and members of the
armed forces.150 Any assault weapons found to be in anyone else’s
possession were seized.151
Justice Andrew Douglas’s majority opinion acknowledged the
controversy that firearms engendered across the country.152 He
recognized the possibility that, if the same issue were debated at the
time of the decision, the state constitution might read differently.153 But
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 1315.
Id.
State v. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, ¶ 15.
Id.
Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ohio 1993).
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 169.
Id.
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he set the contemporary dynamics aside, observing that “it is our charge
to determine and not to disturb the clear protections provided by the
drafters of our Constitution.”154
The text of the Second Amendment uses the term “militia” instead of
referring to individuals. Justice Douglas approached the Second
Amendment as being largely concerned with militias.155 Section 4,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, in contrast, deploys a broader
guarantee: “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and
security.”156 Justice Douglas noted that, unlike the federal Constitution’s
focus on the maintenance of a militia, Section 4, Article I affords
Ohioans broader rights to firearms.157 The language, he found, was
clear.158 The two semicolons suggest three independent clauses,
suggesting that “the people of Ohio chose to go even further” than the
Second Amendment.159 Therefore, the Ohio Constitution appeared to
secure firearm rights to individuals for the defense of self and property,
not limiting the right to militias.160
Examining the legislative history, Justice Douglas observed that there
was no recorded debate over the meaning of the right-to-bear-arms
clause when the Ohio Constitution of 1802 was revised in 1851.161 This
led to the conclusion that the right was uncontroversial at that time.162
Historical analysis revealed that the right to self-defense has never been
unlawful in this nation.163 Not only is the right to defend oneself one of
our fundamental concepts of ordered liberty, but the right to possess a
firearm has also been a symbol of freedom.164 But this liberty is not
without boundaries; just as the framers intended for Ohioans to have the
right to bear firearms, they also intended for reasonable lines to be
154. Id.
155. Justice Douglas did not have the aid of much textual analysis on the Second Amendment.
District of Columbia v. Heller was decided fifteen years after Arnold, and there seemed to be precious
little federal analysis of the Second Amendment at the time. Justices Antonin Scalia and John Paul
Stevens would “volley” opposing textual arguments on the Second Amendment, Stevens arguing that
the omission of firearm uses conventionally associated with individual ownership (such as hunting or
self-defense) was “especially striking” by the affirmative inclusion of individual firearm uses in
contemporary charters like the Declarations of Rights of Pennsylvania and Vermont. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 642 (2008). But in 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court simply noted that
Section 4, Article I of the Ohio Constitution went beyond the militia and secured “to every person a
fundamental individual right to bear arms.” Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169.
156. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4.
157. Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d at 169.
164. Id. at 170.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 8

1116

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

drawn “when certain rights have foreseeable consequences of causing
harm to others.”165 On this analysis, the Court determined that the Ohio
Constitution confers an affirmative, but not absolute, fundamental right
to bear arms.166
Arnold did not go as far as the Supreme Courts of Washington or
Pennsylvania in specifying an analytical methodology in addressing
potentially divergent meanings within the state and federal constitutions.
But the significance of Arnold’s textual and historical grounds for its
result cannot be overstated. Anyone can read Arnold and appreciate why
the Court decided the way it did. This is the kind of principled reasoning
that promotes trust in the judiciary, enables advocates to more clearly
advise their clients, and even gives the losing side the dignity of a wellreasoned, if unfavorable, opinion.
2. Humphrey v. Lane
Justice Judith French has pointed to Humphrey v. Lane as a model of
analysis that state courts would do well to imitate when reading stronger
guarantees into the Ohio Constitution.167 Humphrey was a Native
American who practiced Native American Spirituality and grew his hair
out long in keeping with his faith.168 He was also an employee of a
correctional facility which enforced a grooming policy that required
men to keep their hair no further than their collar.169
The trial court ruled in Humphrey’s favor, finding—by a state
constitutional analysis—that the state could not infringe on a sincerely
held religious belief without showing a compelling state interest and that
the state furthered that interest through the least restrictive means
possible.170 The appellate court reversed, holding that the lower court
had used the wrong constitutional standard.171 The showing of a
compelling state interest was unnecessary. Instead, the appellate court
applied the recently minted Smith analysis, which the United States
Supreme Court used to hold that generally applicable, religion-neutral
laws, having the incidental effect of burdening religious practice, need
not be justified by a compelling state interest.172 Since the grooming
165. Id. at 171.
166. Id. The Court went on to decide that the state could regulate firearm ownership based on its
police power.
167. Video Recording: Interpreting State Constitutions, The Federalist Society, http://www.fedsoc.org/multimedia/detail/interpreting-state-constitutions-event-audiovideo.
168. Humphrey v. Lane, 89 Ohio St.3d 62, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1042.
171. Id. at 1042-43.
172. Id.; see also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
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policy was generally applicable and neutral to religion, Humphrey lost
on appeal.173
Justice Paul Pfeifer began with a textualist inquiry, contrasting the
First Amendment to Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and
recognizing that Section 7 is “devoted entirely to the freedom of
religion.”174 This textual observation recognized that where the federal
Constitution includes free speech and a free press along with the free
exercise of religion, the Ohio Constitution reserves an entire section for
the free exercise of religion. The specific proscription against
“interference with the rights of conscience” was broader than the federal
Constitution’s mandate against laws prohibiting the free expression of
religion.175 A policy that does not prohibit religious expression may
nevertheless interfere with the rights of conscience. Thus, Ohio’s
protection extends further than the federal protection.176 The federal
Constitution brooks tangential effects on religion, but the Ohio
Constitution shows less tolerance for such tangential effects if they
interfere with the conscience.177
What happened in Humphrey is analytically similar to Sterling v.
Cupp, insofar as the state Supreme Court rejected a federal approach but
found a state hook. In Sterling, the state hook was the Oregon
Constitution’s prohibition against treating prisoners with unnecessary
rigor. In Humphrey, the state hook was the Ohio Constitution’s
prohibition against interference with the rights of conscience. Humphrey
differs from Sterling because Article I, Section 7 had a federal corollary:
the Free Expression Clause in the federal Constitution. But critically, the
Ohio Supreme Court rejected the federal analysis on religion cases and
used its own analysis.
The Humphrey analysis primarily applies when the state
constitutional language differs meaningfully from the federal
constitutional text. Unlike Arnold, Humphrey involved no historical
analysis, legislative or judicial. Nor did it look to other states’ decisions.
But Humphrey is significant for its textual and structural analyses and its
rejection of a federal test on the same constitutional right. Justice
Pfeifer’s majority opinion offers principled analysis with respect to
exegeting the disparate meanings within the religion guarantees. But if
the textual and structural differences are less pronounced, Humphrey
may be of limited service.
(1990).
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1043.
Id. at 1044 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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B. Enlarged Equal Protection Rights and the Search for a Legal Theory
One of Ohio’s significant Judicial Federalism cases is State v.
Mole.178 Mole, a police officer, met a 14-year old minor boy on a dating
app.179 The minor initiated contact with Mole, telling him he was 18
years old.180 Mole was 35.181 Upon the minor’s invitation, early one
morning Mole went the minor’s house, where they undressed and
engaged in oral sex. The boy’s mother discovered them. It was then that
the police officer learned that the boy was actually 14.182
Mole was charged with sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(13),
“which prohibits sexual conduct with a minor when the offender is more
than two years older than the minor.”183 Mole argued before that,
because the statute lacked a mens rea and because the statute failed “to
connect a defendant’s occupational status with proscribed sexual
activity,” the statute violated equal protection and due process.184 This
argument failed at the trial level.185 Mole appealed, making the same
equal protection and due process arguments struck down below.186 The
Eight District held that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) “violated equal protection
and was facially unconstitutional.”187
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor’s lead opinion identifies Arnold as
the Ohio Supreme Court’s seminal enunciation of the Judicial
Federalism, embracing the United States Supreme Court’s recurring
reminders to “state courts that they are free to construe their state
constitutions as providing different or even broader individual liberties
than those provided under the federal constitution.”188 A state court is
even free to reject the analysis employed by the United States Supreme
Court in explicating corresponding constitutional guarantees.189 The lead
opinion also acknowledged the Ohio Supreme Court’s inconsistent
employ of the Judicial Federalism. In Robinette III, on remand from the
United States Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court tracked the
federal analysis in construing Section 14, Article I of the Ohio
178. 149 Ohio St. 3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368.
179. Id. at ¶ 3; Julia Bianco, Ohio Supreme Court Rules On Police Officer Accused of Having Sex
with
a
Minor,
Cleveland
19
News
(July
29,
2016,
10:07
a.m.),
http://www.cleveland19.com/story/32572134/matthew-mole-supreme-court.
180. Mole, at ¶ 3-4.
181. Id. at ¶ 4.
182. Id.
183. Id. at ¶ 5.
184. Id. at ¶ 6.
185. Id.
186. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, ¶ 9.
187. Id.
188. Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 42, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993)).
189. Id.
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Constitution, which has “virtually identical” language to the Fourth
Amendment.190 Unlike the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Ohio
Supreme Court had tended to treat similar state constitutional language
as having the same meaning as that with which the United States
Supreme Court had imbued it.
Shortly after Robinette III, members of the Ohio Supreme Court
proclaimed that they would not “‘irreversibly tie [themselves]’ to an
interpretation of the language of the Ohio Constitution just because it is
consistent with language of the federal Constitution.”191 And following
in that spirit, the Mole lead opinion invalidated R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) and
thus
reaffirm[ed] that this court, the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of
the Ohio Constitution, can and will interpret our Constitution to
afford greater rights to our citizens when we believe that such an
interpretation is both prudent and not inconsistent with the intent of
the framers. We also reaffirm that we are not confined by the
federal courts’ interpretations of similar provisions in the federal
Constitution any more than we are confined by other states’ high
courts’ interpretations of similar provisions in their states’
constitutions.192
The lead opinion recounts the same observation Justice Brennan had
made, that “the individual-rights guarantees of the Bill of Rights were
based on pre-existing state constitutional guarantees, not the other way
around.”193 This historical fact is especially germane when United States
Supreme Court rulings “dilute or underenforce” significant individual
rights.194
But when it came to the equal protection analysis—despite
invocations of state court independence—the Mole plurality’s reasoning
is indistinct from federal equal protection analysis. The lead opinion
cites both federal and Ohio cases throughout its equal protection
analysis, without identifying what, if anything, distinguishes them.195
The closest Mole comes to an Arnold analysis was its review of the
historical purposes behind amending the sexual-battery statute to include
a provision on peace officers, in order to determine whether the
190. Id. at ¶ 17; State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 765, 1197-Ohio-343
(Robinette III).
191. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, at ¶ 17 (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 711
N.E.2d 203 (1999)).
192. Id. at ¶ 21.
193. Id. at ¶ 22 (quoting State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 486 (Iowa 2014)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at ¶ 27-28.
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amendment had a rational basis.196 But after reading the Mole Court’s
analysis of the government interest, it is clear that, if this is Ohio’s equal
protection analysis, it is indistinct from the federal analysis.197 As
Justice French’s dissent points out, the lead opinion’s “puzzling”
analysis “does not articulate a new rule or standard for examining equalprotection claims under the Ohio Constitution. Rather, the lead opinion
recites a substantially similar rational-basis test under both the Ohio and
federal Constitutions.”198
Mole invoked constitutional independence, but did not create a new
tier of scrutiny or a new concept of equal protection altogether; rather, it
applied the same test used in the federal courts and cited several federal
cases for support. And to the extent it reached a different result that a
federal court would have reached, it is not clear what analytical
considerations the lead opinion applied to the actual constitutional
provisions. Thus, despite Mole’s purported enlargement of equal
protection rights under the Ohio Constitution, it remains unclear what
legal theory attorneys ought to raise in achieving the same success for
their clients.
C. The Importance of Text and History—and Raising the Argument
Some justices have helpfully signaled what they are looking for in
state constitutional analysis, when they are tasked with addressing
potential differences between the Ohio and federal constitutions. Justice
Sharon Kennedy’s Mole dissent argues that the interpretation of Ohio’s
constitutional provisions “should be guided exclusively by the language
and history of the clause at issue.”199 As for the cases the Mole lead
opinion relied on, most of them—unlike the lead opinion itself—
“engaged in an Arnold analysis by examining the text and history of the
provision before taking the formidable step of declaring that a provision
of the Ohio Constitution is more protective.”200 Justice French also took
issue in Mole with the lack of an independent analysis of the language,
history, and early understandings of Ohio’s equal protection
guarantee.201 She voiced her frustration again in State v. Aalim I, in
which the majority rendered broad constitutional protection—this time
in the due process context—on largely precedential, decisional, and
policy bases, but without Arnold’s more rigorous constitutional analysis.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at ¶ 36-42.
Id. at ¶ 45-68.
Id. at ¶ 118 (French, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 117 (French, J., dissenting).
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Justice French wrote that the majority had asserted “no basis—other
than mere permissibility.”202 Justice Patrick DeWine, in Aalim II, noted
that the recognition that the Ohio Constitution may provide greater
protection does not give the court “unfettered license” to strike down
legislation.203 “Rather, in construing our state Constitution, we are
bound by the text of the document as understood in light of our history
and traditions.”204
Thus, in expressing the importance of textual and historical analyses,
some members of the court are seeking to anchor cases on principles
first articulated in Arnold. Arnold elevated the text and relevant history,
including early understandings of the text, such that these considerations
not only disposed of the legal question, but developed the law as well.
Lack of an Arnold analysis, on the other hand, in the context of equal
protection, will be especially problematic given precedent holding that
the federal and Ohio equal protection clauses are to be “construed and
analyzed identically.”205 Indeed, the issue of whether the Ohio equal
protection clause is or is not coextensive with the federal equal
protection clause seems to, in practice, depend on the case. Mole
purported to apply a broader equal protection right under the Ohio
Constitution than exists under the federal Constitution.206 Yet, a few
months later, in Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio,
the court noted that the two provisions are equivalent.207 But a week
after Simpkins, Ohio’s equal protection clause was “coextensive with, or
stronger than, that of the federal Constitution.”208
Equal protection is just one area of law that would benefit from the
intentional application of a state constitutional interpretive standards. An
Arnold analysis of Article I, Section 2’s text and history—applied to the
question of whether Ohio’s equal protection clause substantively differs
from the federal equal protection clause—would at least have the virtue
of being principled.209 Justice Patrick Fischer has indicated that both a
202. State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 47 (Aalim I)
(vacated). For a discussion of the Aalim cases, see Jesse Knowlden, State of Ohio v. Aalim: Due Process
and Mandatory Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 251 (2018).
203. State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 45 (Aalim II)
(DeWine, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55,
60, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999).
206. Mole at ¶ 23.
207. 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 46. These cases have not drawn
majorities. Mole was a three-justice plurality with one justice concurring in the judgment. Simpkins was
completely splintered, within two justices concurring in the opinion, one justice concurring in the result,
two justices voting to dismiss the case as improvidently accepted, and two justices dissenting.
208. State v. Noling, 149 Ohio St.3d 327, 2016-Ohio-8252, 75 N.E.3d 141, ¶ 11.
209. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore the textual and historical differences of
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textual comparison of the equal protection clauses and recent decisions
“reject the conclusion that the two equal-protection provisions are
‘functionally equivalent.’”210 Ohio’s equal protection language was
formulated in 1851, seventeen years before the federal Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.211 The language of the two
provisions also differs. The federal provision: no state shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”212 The
state provision: “political power is inherent in the people. Government is
instituted for their equal protection and benefit.”213 Therefore, “it is
possible that the two provisions set forth unique protections that are not
necessarily contained in both provisions.”214
Eventually, the Court will address whether it will treat the two
provisions identically. But the Court has been clear that it is
inappropriate to settle the issue when the litigants do not raise or brief
it.215 In Simpkins, among other cases, the parties did not argue that
Ohio’s equal protection clause provided greater protection than the
federal version, and so the court did not consider the possible
differences.216 Thus, it appears that the Ohio Supreme Court is
committed to the dispute-resolution model of deciding cases, as opposed
to the law-declaration model. That is, it will tend to limit itself to the
arguments that the parties raise in their briefs and decide cases based on
the record. And considering some of the opinions of Justices Kennedy,
French, and DeWine, it appears that what will go a long way with the
Ohio Supreme Court is clear analysis of the constitutional text and
history, including early understandings of the text and a keen eye for
precedent. To brief cases along these lines would not break new ground;
it would simply be an application of Arnold. But the issues need to be
raised in order for the Court to decide them.
So it is that both attorneys and judges share in the responsibility to
clarify an approach to Ohio’s constitutional law. On one hand, when
attorneys fail to advance arguments that the Ohio Constitution differs
the two equal protection clauses.
210. State v. Moore, 154 Ohio St.3d 94, 2018-Ohio-3237, 111 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 40 (Fischer, J.,
concurring).
211. Id. at ¶ 39 (Fischer, J., concurring).
212. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
213. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
214. Moore, 2018-Ohio-3237, at ¶ 39 (Fischer, J., concurring).
215. Id. at ¶ 22 (“Most recently, we have considered the two guarantees to be ‘functionally
equivalent’ and employed the same analysis under both provisions. No party has suggested that we do
otherwise today. Thus, we agree with the opinion concurring in judgment only that this is not an
appropriate case to take up the question whether the provisions should be given different treatment.”);
see also id. at ¶ 40 (Fischer, J., concurring).
216. See, e.g., Simpkins at ¶ 46; Stolz v. J & B. Steel Erectors, Inc., 2018-Ohio-5088, ¶ 11; Moore
at ¶ 22; Cleveland v. Oles, 152 Ohio St.3d 1, 2017-Ohio-5384, 92 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 32 fn. 1.
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meaningfully from the federal Constitution, the Court is not likely to
make the argument for them.217 On the other hand, when the Court has
treated the issue, it has occasionally purported to expand protection
under the Ohio Constitution, but without consistently explaining why
the state constitutional guarantee actually affords that protection. It does
not clarify matters when the Court teases that the Ohio Constitution’s
promises are “coextensive with, or stronger than, that of the federal
Constitution,”218 if it does not say how it is stronger or what analysis
applies to make it stronger. Principled guidance as to how the Ohio
Constitution differs from the federal Constitution would invite and
bolster litigants’ constitutional arguments and aid future court
compositions in developing caselaw. But on a court that can change
membership every couple election cycles, lack of guidance will lead to
greater confusion, diminishing the ability of attorneys to shape their
clients’ expectations about what to expect in state courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Federalism provides us with rights under two constitutions. Both are
capable of offering unique protection. It is beneficial when the state
constitution offers added protection, but without principled reasons for
why it is different, courts will render inconsistent outcomes with ad hoc
analysis. The Ohio Supreme Court’s advantage is that, as its
membership changes, the analytical perspectives available to Ohio’s
litigants change. But without a commitment to certain analytical
principles, it has, on occasion, broken loose of its moorings in Arnold.
Judge Sutton’s suggestion that fifty-one imperfect solutions are better
than one imperfect (federal) solution is timely and well-taken.219 For any
state court’s “imperfect solution”—that is, its own approach to
constitutional interpretation—the virtue lies in an opportunity to
articulate meaningful differences between the state and federal
constitutions. A constitutional provision may be indeterminate, but
inquiries into its text and history can yield well-reasoned decisions.
Such decisionmaking promotes the judiciary’s public image as the
branch of government that relies, not on a purse or a sword for
justification, but on its fair and principled reasoning. But on the other
hand, a state court’s vice—the condition keeping its solution
imperfect—is the potential for analytical randomness. In Ohio, the nonadherence to Arnold’s constitutional guidelines leads, at best, to
217. Moore at ¶ 22.
218. State v. Noling, 149 Ohio St.3d 327, 016-Ohio-8252, 75 N.E.3d 141, ¶ 11.
219. Sutton, State Constitutional Law, supra note 7, at 175-76; SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT
SOLUTIONS, supra note 7.
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uncertainty. Attorneys are hindered from counselling their clients based
on reasonable expectations of how courts may apply the Ohio
Constitution. At worst, it threatens to turn constitutional exegesis into
eisegesis: reading meanings into the text that are not there. Deciding
cases out of “judicial necessity”220 compromises the judiciary’s
legitimacy in government and exchanges that great preservative of the
public trust—force of legal reasoning221—for discrete resolutions of
cases that seem to be the result of foregone conclusions. But by
recommitting itself to a rational, reliable, and replicable hermeneutic—
and returning to the standards under Arnold—the Ohio Supreme Court
can make strides in the long project of perfecting our solution to
constitutional differences.

220. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, ¶ 91.
221. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard Posner, How Judge’s Think (2008), 108 MICH. L.
REV. 859, 861 (2010).
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